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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

inverse condemnation "taking by flooding" requirement of deprivation
of all VLX's reasonable use of the property.
VLX appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The appellate
court ruled the correct legal standard involved the question of whether
a continuing physical invasion of the property existed. The court
stated it was not the flooding that caused the taking, but the taking
that caused the flooding. In considering the water flow a continuing
physical invasion, the court concluded VLX proved the three elements
needed to constitute inverse condemnation under the physical
invasion standard. First, SSU entered upon private property with the
water for more than a momentary period. Second, SSU entered under
color of legal authority because SSU was a utility with eminent domain
powers. Third, SSU devoted the property to public use by releasing
the treated wastewater. Under the physical invasion standard, VLX
need not show deprivation of all reasonable use of the property. Thus,
VLX recovered in inverse condemnation, not because there was a
taking by flooding, but because there was a taking by physical invasion.
Tiffany Turner

IDAHO
Dupont v. Idaho State Bd.of Land Comm'rs, 7 P.3d 1095 (Idaho 2000)
(affirming state land board's decision revoking a dock permit granted
in a designated swimming area).
Dupont filed an application with the Idaho Department of Lands
("Department") seeking permission to construct a private dock in the
waters abutting his property. The Department communicated with the
City of Coeur d'Alene ("City") several times regarding the application
of city ordinances to Dupont's proposed dock. In 1992, the State
Board of Land Commissioners ("Board") issued the dock permit when
no timely objections were filed. Subsequently, the Department filed a
notice of appeal regarding Dupont's permit. Likewise, the City
notified the Department of its objection to the permit and requested
the Board to reconsider. The Department scheduled an informal
hearing and concluded the Board validly issued the permit. However,
in 1993, after a hearing officer's recommendation from de novo
contested case hearing, the Board issued a decision revoking Dupont's
permit due to "unusual circumstances." The Board concluded the
proposed dock violated City boating ordinances preventing the
operation of a boat within a designated swimming area.
Dupont appealed to the district court. The district court
concluded the Board's order revoking the permit was erroneous. The
district court determined no procedure existed by which the Board
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could order a de novo reconsideration of the decision to grant
Dupont's permit. The district court held that a revocation hearing
should have been conducted and that the hearing officer applied an
incorrect standard of review. The City appealed and the Board crossappealed the district court's order. The Supreme Court of Idaho
affirmed the decision to revoke Dupont's dock permit.
The City first argued the Board incorrectly classified the hearing as
a revocation proceeding rather than as a reconsideration of the
original decision to issue Dupont's dock permit. The supreme court
determined the City lacked standing to appeal the issue regarding the
characterization of the contested case hearing because the City
suffered no injury as a result of the Board's action.
Dupont also argued the Board incorrectly applied a de novo
standard of review to the contested case hearing. Dupont argued the
Board could only review the record to determine whether the
Department's findings of facts supported its conclusions of law and the
Board could not reweigh the evidence in determining the permit's
initial issuance. The City and the Board argued the de novo standard
was appropriate for revocation
hearings, referencing
the
administrative rules governing lake encroachments.
The Board
reviewed the recommendation and, based on the evidence from the
contested hearing, the Board made an independent determination as
to whether the permit violated applicable laws. Thus, the supreme
court declared the Board's decision valid. As long as the Board
applied the correct standard of review in its decision, it did not matter
that the hearing officer's recommendations were based on an
incorrect standard of review.
Dupont then argued that even if the Board applied the correct
standard of review, the relevant statutory law was unconstitutionally
vague.
Dupont argued the phrase "the most unusual of
circumstances" could not be reasonably interpreted and thus was
subjective. The City argued the statutory law is reasonably interpreted.
The City noted that the supreme court had previously held a statute
would not be void for vagueness when such terms could be interpreted
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, or common meaning. The
supreme court stated the Board, under ordinary circumstances, could
grant a permit as long as such permit did not infringe on the littoral
rights of adjacent owners. The statute additionally gave the Board the
right to deny a permit if the circumstances regarding a particular
encroachment were not ordinary. The supreme court concluded that
such relevant law was not unconstitutionally vague. The supreme
court held the phrase in the code "the most unusual of circumstances"
could be reasonably interpreted based on the ordinary meaning of the
words.
The supreme court found the existence of the designated
swimming area in the location of the proposed encroachment highly
relevant to the question of whether the proposed encroachment (the
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dock) presented "unusual circumstances." Dupont argued the Board's
decision was not based on substantial and competent evidence because
the Board impermissibly considered the intended use of the proposed
encroachment, instead of focusing only on the placement and
existence of the dock. Dupont contended the Board had the right to
regulate the existence of this encroachment, but could not regulate
the use of it. The supreme court held the Board possessed the
authority to consider the intended use of the proposed encroachment
in making its determination to revoke the permit based on the
existence of unusual circumstances.
Both the City and the Board argued substantial and competent
evidence supported the Board's decision that the existence of unusual
circumstances required the revocation of Dupont's permit. The City
produced evidence that the area had been a designated swimming
area for approximately forty years, and the City had an encroachment
permit, granted for at least ten years, to place buoys around the area.
Dupont argued the beach area in front of the swimming area was
private property. While riparian owners have a traditional right to
"wharf out," such right was clearly subject to state regulation. Thus,
the supreme court held substantial and competent evidence supported
the Board's finding of "unusual circumstances."
Finally, the City argued the Board erred in rejecting the hearing
officer's conclusion that the City had been given inadequate notice. In
contrast, the Board and Dupont contended the City's argument was
moot because the City received actual notice of the proposed
encroachment in a timely fashion. The supreme court determined
that this question was moot, and asserted it could overturn an
administrative agency's incorrect decision only if an appellant's
substantial rights had been prejudiced. The supreme court held the
City's rights had not been prejudiced because the City was allowed to
intervene in the action, present its evidence and witnesses, and be
heard at all stages of the revocation hearing.
Nicole Anderson
Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 13 P.3d 855 (Idaho
2000) (finding that when a district court is assigned exclusive
jurisdiction over a river adjudication, Idaho Department of Water
Resources decisions involving that river cannot be reviewed by any
other district court).
Sagewillow, Inc. ("Sagewillow") acquired water rights in the Snake
River water system. Six water rights authorized irrigation of 2,383
acres. The Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") approved
Sagewillow's first application for transfer of place of use and point of
diversion in 1992. No protests were filed to the transfer. Four years
later, after Sagewillow applied for seven additional place of use

